



Bayan بیان ביאן The Arabs in Israel הערבים בישראל

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From the Editors' Desk

We are pleased to release a new issue of *Bayan*, containing two essays. The first, by Nasreen Hadad Haj Yahya, deals with the obstacles facing young Arab high school graduates entering the job market in Israel. The second essay, by Shlomi Daskal, discusses the elections held in Nazareth Illit for the head of the local council, and the political conduct of local Arab public representatives in that campaign.

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The Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation (KAP) was established in 2004 by the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University as part of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. KAP is an expansion of the Program on Arab Politics in Israel established by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University in 1995. The purpose of KAP is to deepen the knowledge and understanding of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel through conferences, public lectures and workshops, as well as research studies, publications and documentation.

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The Editors

Nasreen Hadad Haj Yahya* / The Obstacles Facing Young Arab High School Graduates Entering the Job Market

Introduction

The years between ages 18 and 22 constitute a major crossroads for young people, during which the decisions they make have far-reaching implications for all aspects of their future lives. Over the course of these years, young people acquire education or vocational training, and gradually become financially independent. For many young people, this is a turbulent period, with major changes in interpersonal relations, workplace relations, and personal worldview (Krause, Shavit, & Yaish, 1998).

In Israel, most young Jewish people of this age group are recruited by the IDF after they graduate from high school, postponing any decisions related to their future for several years. Meisels (2002) reviewed numerous studies on the military stage in Israelis' lives and found that military service offers young people the opportunity to practice various roles and develop interpersonal relations in a setting that is far removed from the milieu in which they grew up. As a result, although military service is compulsory, in Jewish Israeli society, it is considered an important stage of personal growth and development, and a catalyst of maturation. Furthermore, the IDF offers young Jewish people unable to afford education with the opportunity to learn technical skills or even acquire a high-tech, white collar profession. Such opportunities reduce these young people's risk of unemployment. Even Jews who do not acquire a profession during their military service have opportunities to develop contacts and ties that may help them attain employment.

The situation of young Arabs in Israel is different. As a result of their non-participation in military service, they enter the job market when they are younger and less mature than their Jewish counterparts, and do not receive the guidance that the military provides to young Jewish Israelis. When they graduate from high school, young Arabs are expected to become independent and cope with complex life tasks. Their transition from adolescence to adulthood is swift and imposes difficult demands on them. No research effort to date has studied the effect of 18 to 22-year-old Arabs' widespread exclusion from opportunities to integrate into the Israeli job market and education system. My aim is to illuminate the association between ethnic and gender obstacles to employment, the differential distribution of human capital in ethnic groups, and these obstacles' impact on the NEET* of young people in marginalized groups, focusing on young Arabs in Israel of this age group. It is important to study the association between these obstacles and NEET, especially in this age group, because it is during this period of their lives that young people face the challenge of integrating into society.

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* NEET: a sociological acronym, referring to young people who are "Not in Education, Employment, or Training".

Obstacles facing young Arabs

The job opportunities available to Arabs in Israel are more limited than those available to Jews. Exclusion of Arabs from the job market can be traced to the Israel's independence, when rural Arabs were dispossessed of their lands in the efforts to "Judaize" the country. Dispossession transformed Arabs into members of the working class, dependent on the economy of the Zionist state with its obviously Jewish orientation (Jamal, 2011; Schnell & Soffer, 2006). Multiple structural obstacles hinder the integration of Arabs in the Israeli job market, and many are based on ethno-national factors and peripherality (Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, & Al-Haj, 1994). As a result of discriminatory policies, the standard of education in the Arab sector is lower than that in the Jewish sector (Abu Asba, 2007), which makes it difficult for young Arabs to attain elite occupations (Feniger, Livneh, & Yogev, 2012; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 2011). The range of jobs open to Arabs is severely limited by racism, discrimination, and exclusion in hiring processes and exclusion from work within the defense industry and security sector. Of all the obstacles facing young Arabs in Israel, I focus on those that operate in the social and the geographic spheres, and their impact on human capital accumulation potential.

Approximately 90% of the Arab minority in Israel resides in Arab towns, with the remainder residing in mixed cities whose neighborhoods are largely segregated (Benenson & Omer, 2003; Hamdan, 2006). Israel is divided into center and peripheral regions, with Arabs largely residing in the latter. Peripheral regions suffer from limited opportunities due to their remoteness from central economic and decision making regions. The state of development in peripheral regions is dictated by the center, based on the center's economic interests (Shils, 1975), reinforcing social gaps and inequity (Friedman, 1972, 1973; Gilbert & Gugler, 1982). In recent years, it has been suggested that in the globalization era, the growing mobility of people, goods, and information, reduces the disadvantages of inaccessible peripheral regions (Brunn & Leinbach, 1991). Several studies have shown that in some cases, the disadvantages of peripherality can be overcome through effective government policy (Ben Aryeh, 2004). However, other studies show that while globalization increases the intermingling of diverse, remote populations, it also increases neo-liberal governments' tendency to reduce their role in guaranteeing the personal security of their citizens (Becker, 2009). As a result, population groups are becoming more sharply segregated and insular (Shalev, 1991).

The public sphere in Israel continues to exclude the Arab minority from access to resources and opportunities. The social realm may limit the opportunities for young Arabs to integrate into the job market and higher education for three reasons: First, a considerable proportion of Arab villages and towns are geographically and socio-economically remote from the country's regional centers of employment, and therefore have fewer social, economic, and employment opportunities (Schnell, 1994; Rekhess & Rudnitzky, 2009). Second, internal structural obstacles stemming from the social or cultural features of Arab society operate at the individual, family, community, and local government levels to deepen Arabs' social segregation in Israel. As members of an ethno-national minority, young Arabs find it difficult to break through the boundaries of the Arab sphere and integrate into Jewish spheres. Third, traditional-social norms restrict young Arab women to the private sphere, making it all the more difficult for them to integrate into Jewish spheres in the center.

In light of the overlapping effects of peripherality and segregation on the opportunities available to young Arabs, these factors are considered together as restrictive spatial factors.

Over the years, government policy in Israel has created spatial patterns segregated by nationality (Hamdan, 2006). While this policy indirectly reduced friction between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority, it also led to a decline in the various capital resources that young Arabs are able to accumulate from sources in Jewish society (Schnell & Haj-Yahya, 2014). These capital resources include human capital (knowledge, skills, and aptitudes that individuals acquire through education and training in order to increase their future earning potential (Becker, 2009), economic capital (monetary income and financial resources and assets), and social capital (knowledge, educational training, experience, values, beliefs, and behavioral norms jointly accumulated by a community or society (Bourdieu, 1986).

Putnam (2000) distinguishes between three types of social capital: *cohesive social capital*, which is formed through primary ties among family members, neighbors, and co-workers who share similar demographic, social, and economic features; *bridging social capital*, based on looser ties among people who come from different backgrounds, yet belong to the same economic status and have identical access to politics; and *bonding social capital*, which is formed through ties connecting typically marginalized population groups to centers of decision making and individuals in positions of power. Bonding social capital enhances marginalized groups' access to a variety of resources, and its absence increases the risk of economic instability and limited employment opportunities. Within Arab society in Israel, Arabs benefit from cohesive social capital, a situation that might also limit entrepreneurs from breaking into networks outside Arab society (Soffer, 2006). However, Arabs lack bonding social capital due to their remoteness from elite Israeli groups, and they find it difficult to develop bridging social capital in a Jewish Israeli society that is mistrustful of them (Schnell & Haj-Yahya, 2014). As a result, young Arabs must invest greater efforts in order to create effective social capital for themselves, enhancing the limited resources that bonding social capital can provide.

Discussion and conclusions

I believe that young Arabs in Israel are prisoners of their geographic spheres, which limit the range of opportunities available to them. Their physical and social marginalization restricts access to resources and opportunities. Women face heightened restrictions due to social controls that limit their choices. Women suffer from cultural obstacles as well, which explains why NEET among young Arab women is especially high. Self-segregating Arab men, who avoid forming ties with members of Jewish society, suffer from moderate levels of NEET, while integrated males suffer from relatively low levels of NEET, or levels of NEET similar to Jewish, residents of peripheral areas.

Based on these findings, the government should develop a policy that facilitates the transition of young Arabs from high school to the job market, in an effort to reduce NEET, especially among young Arab women from traditional Arab towns and villages. The government should work jointly with civil society organizations to develop the education system, vocational programs, and relevant guidelines. Models for attaining economic independence are needed not only when young Arabs graduate from high school, but also earlier, during their teens. An absence of efforts to address these issues could undermine social cohesion and reduce the participation of inactive youth in social, political, and civil activities. On the other hand, increasing the

participation and integration of young Arabs in Israeli society might increase their sense of belonging to the country. This enhances the social and economic resilience of Israeli society, particularly for the Arab population. In addition to enhancing social resilience, integration of young male and female Arabs in Israel might function as a lever of economic growth for the entire country.

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Shlomi Daskal* / Nazareth Illit: From Judaization of the Galilee to a Mixed City, Vision versus Reality

Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth) was established in 1956 alongside Nazareth, Israel's largest Arab city, as a Jewish settlement on lands expropriated from local Arab residents as part of the vision of the "Judaization of the Galilee". However, over the years, Arabs too have relocated to Nazareth Illit, for a variety of reasons.¹ According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (as of 2014), the city houses 40,000 residents, 20% of which are Arab. The demographic changes have led to occasional discord between Jews and Arabs, especially in times of national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians², however, there is also friction on day-to-day matters, such as the building of Arab schools in the city, increasing the quantity of Arabic-language books in the local library, the placement of the Christmas tree, and more. These requests were summarily dismissed by the mayor, Shimon Gafsou, a Likud party member. Moreover, upon his election in 2008, Gafsou worked to emphasize the city's Jewishness, whether through symbolic acts such as installing an unusually large Israeli flag at the entrance of the city and dispersion of Stars of David through the city's streets, or by encouraging religious, right-wing populations to settle there³. In the 2013 municipal election cycle, Gafsou chose the slogan "Nazareth Illit Jewish forever," although, on more than one occasion, he explained that "everyone is welcome to live in the city."⁴

Politics and Communication – The Art of the Impossible

It would seem possible to describe Nazareth Illit as another city wherein Jews and Arabs clash on nationalist grounds. However, the case of Nazareth Illit is different because of two interesting personalities: Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh and Dr. Ra'ed Ghattas. Physicians by trade, the two demonstrated remarkable political resourcefulness, and succeeded in shrewdly navigating municipal politics. They quickly became key figures in the city's public life by being aware of their strength, as well as their limitations. In 2008, seven years before the unification of the Israel's Arab parties via the Joint List, 'Awawdeh, a Hadash party member, and Ghattas, a Balad party member whose brother Dr. Bassel Ghattas has been one of the party's representatives in the Knesset in recent years, understood the power of a united Arab list and joined

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¹ This phenomenon is not unique to Nazareth Illit. For more on this phenomenon and its causes, see: Shuki Sadeh. "Arabs Flock from Beit Hanina to Ramat Aviv," *The Marker* (18.12.2005).

² Ahikam Moshe David. "Nazareth Illit: Clashes in the Midst of the Operation in Gaza," *NRG* (01.10.2009).

³ Ahikam Moshe David. "Goodbye Nazareth Illit: Shimon Gafsou's Plan to Judaize the City," *NRG* (10.11.2009); Avika Lam. "The Jews of Nazareth Illit Fight for the City's Identity," *Channel-20 Y-NET* (25.02.2015)

⁴ "Gafsou Promises to Return to Nazareth Illit and Quiet the Arabs," *Radio Al-Shams Website* (08.12.2015). (غابسو يؤكد للشمس عودته لرناسة بلدية، عيليت ويطنن السكان العرب)

forces for the Nazareth Illit council elections under the name “The United List for Co-existence.”

The United List of Nazareth Illit reached the height of its power this year, in light of special mayoral elections following Mayor Shimon Gafsou’s dismissal from the office for a criminal conviction. At first, the members toyed with the idea of entering the mayoral race, however, with a limited number of potential candidates, they concluded that their entry into the race would stir racial strife, and serve to reframe the elections as part of the Jewish-Arab conflict, thereby damaging The Joint List’s achievements thus far. Therefore, the members preferred to support a Jewish candidate in return for gaining accomplishments for Nazareth Illit’s Arab citizens from within the municipal framework.

Two Jewish candidates competed for The Nazareth Joint List’s support: Netanel Twito, who had served as acting mayor (and, at the time, led a coalition with which The List was allied), and Ronen Plot, a former Knesset CEO, who was identified with the right side of the political spectrum. Previously, Plot had served under Likud minister Yuli Edelstein as general manager of the Ministry of Absorption, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, and most recently, as general manager under Edelstein in his capacity as Speaker of the Knesset. After deliberation, The United List decided to publicly back Plot. They announced their support only one day before the elections – a prudent political move to minimize opportunities for Plot’s opponents to portray the election as a matter of Jewish-Arab conflict. After the announcement, the party ensured that their decision was broadcast through every available network. They even uploaded a special video to Balad’s YouTube channel, which featured Dr. Ghattas calling their constituency to vote for Plot.⁵ This formed a surprising political coalition: ‘Awawdeh and Ghattas cooperated with Likud’s Plot and an additional council member from the Israel Beiteinu party (viewed as hostile among many Arabs in Israel), Alex Gadlekin, who had once urged Arabs to leave the city in return for financial compensation.⁶

Additionally, days before the election, Plot circulated a video in which he received Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s endorsement. The news site, al-Arab, a subsidiary of Kul al-Arab, in a rare reference to elections, questioned whether The List would endorse a right-wing candidate who is supported by the Prime Minister, and included the video in their report.⁷

Another arena in which there were interesting developments with regard to the elections was the media. In general, Israel’s Arab media showed little interest in the elections, with the exception of two media outlets: the news site *Bukra* and the television station *Musawa*. *Bukra*, an independent news site funded by the Zoabi family, volunteered unequivocal support for Plot.⁸ *Musawa* made no endorsement, however, the station provided a variety platforms for Ghattas and ‘Awawdeh to disseminate their political philosophy, and even allowed ‘Awawdeh to make an on-

⁵ Ra'ed Ghattas. “Nazareth Illit Elections,” 48 راند غطاس.. انتخابات نتسيرت عليت عرب (07.06.2015)

⁶ Kobi David. “A Proposal in Nazareth Illit: Arab Families Will be Compensated – and Leave,” *Walla! News* (13.06.2012); Plot publicly supported right-wing journalist, Sharon Gal; Hila Glazer. “Who Will Save Nazareth Illit?” *Haaretz* (09.06.2016).

⁷ “Will Arab Citizens Support Likud Candidate Ronen Plot?” *Al-arab* (05.06.2016). Interestingly, this story has no byline. The possibility that this criticism’s source may have been intended to discredit *Bukra*, a competitor who openly endorsed Plot.

⁸ For more on the mobilization of the *Bukra* website see Shlomi Daskal: “On Behalf of Journalism, a Reading of Co-Existence,” *The Seventh Eye* (09.06.2016).

air appeal for the citizens of Nazareth Illit to vote for Plot on the day of the elections.⁹ It is important to note that Musawa is a satellite TV station of the Palestinian Authority that addresses Israel's Arab citizens, and that in the past, the Israeli government has attempted to shut it down.¹⁰ Paradoxically, this station has contributed to the election of Plot, who as mentioned, was the Israeli Prime Minister's favorite.

Even before election day, Dr. 'Awawdeh had presented his rationale for cooperation at the Nazareth Illit council: "What's happening in Nazareth Illit is a reflection of what's happening in the Knesset and in the Israeli government at large; the local authority reflects the activities of the Ministry of Interior, which is run by the Interior Minister, and above him is the Prime Minister, and they are all from the Israeli Right...obtaining [our rights] will require maneuvering within the framework of the local government...we will not establish the Palestinian State in Nazareth Illit, but our demands [regarding] daily matters will be [fulfilled]."¹¹

Among those demands were the construction of an Arab school from grades K-12 to serve over 2,000 Arab students in the city, infrastructure investment in Kramim, the city's central Arab neighborhood, and the establishment of community centers for the Arab public.¹² In an attempt to defend their support of Plot, 'Awawdeh presented favorable facts: Plot had formerly been a member of the Labor Party and was close with the dovish Yossi Beilin; as CEO of the Knesset and government ministries he had not been a Likud member; the members of the United Arab List gave their assurance that Plot was not politically biased and that their relations with him were good; it's possible to live peacefully with his political views; cooperation with Plot would allow The United List to clench executive positions in the municipality, and would enable them to turn a new page in relations between Nazareth Illit and neighboring Arab settlements. Before the elections, and afterward, 'Awawdeh and Ghattas took pains to present the result which was most crucial for their purposes – that the Arab voice would decide the election .¹³

The Neighbor Casts Criticism

Criticism of the cooperation between Nazareth Illit's Arab List and Prime Minister Netanyahu's candidate spread mainly through social media networks. An unusual critical stance arrived from the city's neighbor, the Arab city of Nazareth. Upon the publication of the signing of the coalition agreement, the City of Nazareth

⁹ Afternoon Broadcast (الظهيرة), *Musawa Channel* (07.06.2016).

¹⁰ Hassan Sha'alan and Ran Boker. "Netanyahu against '48: On the Closure of the New Channel for Arab Israelis," *YNET* (18.06.2015); Yaniv Kovovich and Jackie Khourie. "Erdan Orders the Closure of Palestinian Television Channel Operating in Israel," *Haaretz* (24.06.2016). It's important to note that Musawa was not gentle in its treatment of Awawdeh, especially in interviews with Ramzi Hakim, during which the oversized Israeli flag at the city's entrance and the Stars of David throughout the city were shown as a background view .

¹¹ "Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh – We are considering running a candidate for the Nazareth Illit municipality" (التاسعة مع رمزي 9 O'clock with Ramzi Hakim (د. شكري عواودة - ن فكر بترشيح مرشح عربي لرئاسة بلدية نتسيرت) (حكيم), *Musawa Channel* (01.04.2016).

¹² "Here's what the United List achieved in return for the coalition." (" هذا ما حصلت عليه 'المشتركة' مقابل ") (التاسعة مع رمزي حكيم) (9 O'Clock with Ramzi Hakim), *Musawa Channel* (05.08.2016). According to Awoudeh, the coalition agreement dealt with these issues on one level or another.

¹³ "Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh: Deputy Mayor of Nazareth Illit" (د. شكري عواودة نائب رئيس بلدية نتسيرت عيليت) (Raddarsite (02.08.016).

municipality issued a statement condemning the agreement and personally attacked 'Awawdeh and Ghattas.¹⁴

About a week later, Nazareth's mayor Ali Salaam complained in an interview that the United List leadership had earlier shunned him for his supposed ties to the Likud. Now they were congratulating themselves for entering into a coalition with Likud party members."¹⁵

In spite of the criticism, the two pressed on, with Ghattas highlighting their seminal accomplishment: "In these elections it was revealed that we have the power to determine the outcome. In every future race, it will be known that no one will become mayor without the Arab voice." In addition to presenting their achievements since the establishment of the list, 'Awawdeh explained, "They attacked us as though the candidate in Nazareth Illit had been George Habash, and we abandoned him to support Ronen Plot [...] the choice was between a right-wing candidate from the Likud who recognizes our right to coexist, and a right-wing fascist who doesn't recognize our right to speak."¹⁶ It is important to note that unlike his statements during the campaign, 'Awawdeh admitted that Plot was a Likud member and not an unaffiliated candidate. In another instance, 'Awawdeh wrote that Plot understands the sensitivities of the Arab public. For example, in his victory speech, Plot did not surround himself with Jewish national symbols, and he also called for co-existence between Jews and Arabs.¹⁷

Taking Responsibility without Forgetting the Past

In an interview intended to spur the Arab public to vote, Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh shared his personal credo:

"We cannot sit in the corner slinging catchwords and saying 'they're racist,' [even if] it is true. In order to create positive influence, one must influence from within ...and to maintain your minimum or maximum national identity, while pulling the majority to identify with a threatened and oppressed minority. And that's what we we're doing in Nazareth Illit."¹⁸

Additionally, the Joint List of Nazareth Illit believes that they are leading a change of mind – that they, the Arabs, serve all the city's citizens and not just their own constituency. As part of the call to take responsibility for the goings on in the city, they point out that their municipal activities for Arab citizens have led to interaction with Jewish citizens, namely at cultural events. In the same breath, they admit that the

¹⁴ 15. "Nazareth Municipality Mercilessly Attacks Nazareth Illit's Joint List." بلدية الناصرة تهاجم (بلدية الناصرة تهاجم). Panet (26.07.2016).

¹⁵ Agenda, Israel Radio in Arabic (02.08.2016). The interview garnered national attention from the Hebrew-language media follow Salam's comments that Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) had urged Arab residents to vote for the Joint List. As such, he justified PM Benjamin Netanyahu's claims on election day that "Arabs are flocking to the polls." A close review of his comments indicates that the criticism was directed at Abbas, who had promised to help stabilize the municipality's coalition if would aid the Joint List.

¹⁶ Riham Riham Yusef Athamneh. "Why We Endorsed Plot," *Bukra* (09.06.2016).

¹⁷ Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh. "Between National Identity and Clarity of Vision" بين الانتماء الوطني ووضوح الرؤية. *Al-arab* (08.06.2016).

¹⁸ Afternoon broadcast (الظهيرة). *Musawa Channel* (07.06.2016).

interaction is mutual – Arab citizens attend the events of their Jewish neighbors, which in turn, leads to exposure and mutual recognition.¹⁹

It is important to note that this is not a kitschy co-existence story nor a honorable Arab acceptances of the Jewish-Zionist hegemony. Both Awawdeh and Ghattas don't neglect to mention the past and in fact the expropriation of Arab lands, which served as the basis for Nazareth Illit's establishment, serves as their start point '. For them, Nazareth Illit is the land of their ancestors, upon which they are not guests and this provides an impetus to participate in the city's happenings.²⁰ Furthermore, they are convinced that civic activity and taking part in the municipal scene will lead the Arab public to successes at the national level.²¹ For 'Awawdeh and Ghattas, this applies not only to Nazareth Illit, but rather, view their municipal work as something that should be used as a model for mixed cities throughout the country. For them, just as the unification of The Joint List of Nazareth Illit preceded the unification of Arab parties on a national level, so too must Nazareth Illit serve as a model for mixed cities. In 'Awawdeh 's words: "The Joint List in Nazareth Illit [...] is a pioneer in national activity, and the spark that created the Joint List on the national [level]. It is necessary that the committees which monitor the conflict, along with the committees of [Arab] regional councils, pay attention to our struggle for an egalitarian existence as an example to be tested in mixed cities."²²

'Awawdeh promised that a Joint List member will not serve on the council more than two terms. Therefore, he does not intend to run in the municipal elections in 2018.²³ It is not unlikely to imagine that Dr. 'Awawdeh may one day serve as a member of the Knesset. Will the Nazareth Illit model ascend to national politics? Time will tell.

¹⁹ "Arabs reap High Positions in Nazareth Illit Municipality, Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh" (العرب يجنون أماكن رفيعة في بلدية نتسيرت عليت - د. شكري عواودة) Our Morning (صباحنا غير), *Musawa Channel* (01.08.2016).

²⁰ "Here's what the Joint List achieved in return for the coalition." ("هذا ما حصلت عليه المشتركة مقابل") 9 O'Clock with Ramzi Hakim (التاسعة مع رمزي حكيم), *Musawa Channel* (05.08.2016).

²¹ Even 'Ali Salam, mayor of neighboring Nazareth, represents Arab activism. However, in the eyes of the Arab public (and in the eyes of the Arab political establishment), Salam was perceived as a collaborator with the right-wing government who had relinquished national principles, especially in light of the revelation during the mayoral elections in Nazareth that he had previously been a Likud Party member.

²² Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh. "Between National Identity and Clarity of Vision" (بين الانتماء الوطني ووضوح الرؤية). *Al-arab* (08.06.2016)

²³ "Arabs reap High Positions in Nazareth Illit Municipality, Dr. Shukri 'Awawdeh" (العرب يجنون أماكن رفيعة في بلدية نتسيرت عليت - د. شكري عواودة) Our Morning (صباحنا غير), *Musawa Channel* (01.08.2016).